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In this paper, I focus on two issues which lurk behind much feminist discussion of ascriptions of sexual orientation: (1) the relation between sexual 
orientation and gender, and (2) the relations between ascriptions of sexual orientation and ascriptions of sexual identity. In particular, I argue that once 
we attend to the distinction between sexual orientation and sexual identity it becomes clear that the self-acknowledgement interpretation, at least for the 
sexual orientation lesbian, has the theoretical and empirical justification most consistent with a feminist perspective. 
R E S U M E 
Dans cet article, nous nous concentrons sur deux questions qui reviennent dans beaucoup des debats feministes sur l'attribution de l'orientation 
sexuelle: (1) le rapport entre celle-ci et le genre, et (2) les rapports entre 1'attribution de l'orientation sexuelleetcellede l'identite sexuelle. En particulier, 
nous indiquonsque lorsque Ton s'interesse a la distinction entre orientation sexuelle el indentite sexuelle, il est c lair que c'est dans Interpretation de la 
reconnaissance de soi, au moins pour la lesbienne d'orientation sexuelle, que Ton trouve la justification theorique et empirique qui est la plus 
compatible avec une perspective feministe. 
A m I lesbian? Is it p o l i t i c a l cowardice that makes us 
heterosexuals? D o bisexuals exist? Does my sexual orienta-
t ion tell you w h o I really am? Christ ine Overall 's paper 
begins for us an unusual course i n orienteering—personal 
and pol i t i ca l orienteering i n the hazardous but fascinating 
terrain of sexuality. 
As w i t h the rest of us, Overall 's i n i t i a l interest is i n the 
ontological and epistemological questions, " W h a t is a 
lesbian (a heterosexual, a bisexual)?" and " H o w w o u l d I 
k n o w if I or anyone else was one?". She observes that the 
fundamental question seems to be a conceptual one, 
" W h a t is meant or might be meant by saying that someone 
is a lesbian (a heterosexual, a bisexual)?". However, Over-
a l l also astutely notices that, i n this case, the question of 
meaning is not a " s i m p l e matter of d e f i n i t i o n " for femi-
nists. She underlines Adrienne Rich 's remark "the process 
of n a m i n g and def in ing is not an intellectual game, but a 
grasping of our experience and a key to ac t ion . " In a word, 
" W h a t is a lesbian?" is a pol i t ica l question. 
Overa l l explores current theories about the meanings of 
ascriptions of sexual orientations as a route to understand-
i n g their ethical, ontological and pol i t i ca l underpinnings. 
In the end, without completely settling the question, her 
a i m is " to contribute to ways of interpreting ascriptions of 
sexual orientation w h i c h have some theoretical and 
empirical justification consistent w i t h a feminist perspec-
tive. '' That , too, is my a i m as I j o i n her i n the enterprise of 
assessing alternative interpretations of ascriptions of sex-
ual orientation. I propose to contribute to the conversa-
t ion she has initiated as an unabashed enthusiast for one of 
the interpretations she rejects. 
In my commentary I w i l l discuss two issues w h i c h lurk 
behind much feminist discussion of ascriptions of sexual 
orientation: 
(1) the relation between sexual orientation and gender; 
and 
(2) the relation between ascriptions of sexual orientation 
and ascriptions of sexual identity. 
The Relation Between Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Early i n her paper, Overal l argues for the importance of 
dis t inguishing sexual orientation from both biological 
sex and gender. She is in i t ia l ly concerned w i t h rejecting 
historical c l inical definitions w h i c h conflated sexual 
orientation and gender so that 
A heterosexual w o m a n was thought to be a woman 
who assumed the appropriate gender role as a femi-
nine w o m a n ; a lesbian was a w o m a n w h o rejected 
her gender role, and wanted to be male. 1 
She observes, as does M a r i l y n Frye, that stil l the popular 
image of the lesbian is that of a w o m a n who does not fit 
the patterns of gender imposed on the sexes. Rather, "She 
is seen as a female w h o is not feminine. . . . " 2 
Overa l l notes that these connotations of the term "les-
b i a n " are st i l l used to denigrate lesbian women and to 
keep heterosexual women in their place. T h u s she urges, 
O n l y persistent feminist cr i t ic ism can help to make 
it clear that sex, gender, and sexual orientation are 
not inextricably l inked; that gender and sexual 
orientation may vary independently of one another 
and that stereotyping by gender or sexual orienta-
t ion is morally opprobrious. 
It is clear what Overal l has i n m i n d . N o t a l l lesbians are 
women w h o are masculine or want to be male. E m p i r i c a l 
research bears her out on this po int . ' 
I share Overall 's concern to reject inaccurate historical 
c l i n i c a l definit ions and to reject stereotypes associated 
w i t h sexual orientations. However, I think it useful to 
separately address the two issues involved i n her discus-
sion. Does lesbianism involve gender deviance? H o w 
should we evaluate it if it does? 
T h e fact that not a l l lesbians exhibit certain forms of 
gender deviance such as masculine behavior or the desire 
to be male is insufficient reason to reject the c la im that 
lesbianism involves gender deviance. There is a variety of 
forms of gender deviance w h i c h might be involved. We 
can dist inguish at least two broad categories of gender 
deviance: gender-identity deviance and gender-role de-
viance. Gender identity is, loosely speaking, one's sense of 
oneself as a w o m a n or a man, a g i r l or a boy. 4 Gender-
identity deviance for a w o m a n might consist of not think-
i n g of oneself as a w o m a n , or not w a n t i n g to be a w o m a n ; 
but, this need not entail w a n t i n g to be a man. Gender-role 
deviance w o u l d consist of rejecting feminine attitudes, 
behavior, or appearance w h i c h are associated w i t h gender 
role for women. 
Examples of gender-role deviance for white, middle 
class women in this culture might include refusing to 
make oneself attractive to men, showing no interest i n 
nurturance, advocating that women should h o l d the 
highest positions of authority i n our social institutions, or 
i n i t i a t i n g sexual relations w i t h women. Notice that one 
can exhibit gender-role deviance as a w o m a n and st i l l not 
be masculine in appearance nor want to be a man. Cer-
tainly desiring to have, or hav ing sexual relations w i t h 
women is, i n this culture, clearly gender deviant for 
women. 
T h e question of the valuation of lesbianism needs to be 
dist inguished from the question of gender deviance. Many 
contemporary lesbians understand lesbianism to involve 
gender deviance, both gender-identity deviance and gender-
role deviance, but they value it positively. Indeed, they 
often use their gender deviance as a prod or challenge to 
heterosexual women to question their o w n identif ication 
w i t h the (male-constructed) gender w o m a n , and w i t h the 
gender role prescribed for w o m e n . 5 Consider Jeffner 
Al len ' s p r o u d remark: 
I break w i t h reproductive memory. I no longer c la im 
to be w o m a n , the counter part of man, she w h o is 
possessed by men. / posit my own freedom. I place 
myself with all who would be women no longer: 
lesbians* 
Whether or not a lesbian sexual orientat ion can or 
s h o u l d be interpreted as i n v o l v i n g gender deviance de-
pends u p o n the meaning of the term " w o m a n " i n a given 
culture, and u p o n the understanding of the role prescribed 
for women as women. In short, it depends u p o n the inter-
pretation of the gender woman, and the gender role for 
women. T h i s is te l l ing and directs our attention to one of 
Overall 's fundamental assertions, the c la im that there is 
not an inextricable l i n k between gender, sex and sexual 
orientation. 
C o n t r a Overa l l , I th ink there is a n inextricable l i n k be-
tween gender and the sexual orientation lesbian. If there 
were not, one c o u l d plausibly say that someone c o u l d be a 
lesbian and a man; or, when we say of someone that the 
person is a lesbian, we should not k n o w , f rom that ascrip-
t ion alone, whether the person is male or female. A l l the 
viable different interpretations of lesbian have one th ing 
i n c o m m o n : the i n d i v i d u a l to w h o m the sexual orienta-
t ion is ascribed is a woman. Consider: a lesbian is a 
w o m a n w h o wants to be a man; a lesbian is a w o m a n w h o 
has sexual relations w i t h other w o m e n ; a lesbian is a 
w o m a n w h o has erotic feelings for women; a lesbian is a 
w o m a n w h o has certain poli t ical commitments to women. 
There is an interesting asymmetry between lesbian sex-
ual orientation and other sexual orientations i n this 
regard. In ascribing the sexual orientat ion lesbian to 
someone, we also thereby ascribe the gender woman to 
her. N o other ascription of a sexual orientation involves 
the ascription of a particular gender. In ascribing the 
sexual orientat ion heterosexual or bisexual , we do not 
thereby ascribe a gender. T h e sexual orientation homo-
sexual is somewhat ambiguous because the term homo-
sexual, l ike the term man, has been used i n a generic sense. 
In k n o w i n g that someone is homosexual , we can not be 
sure f rom that description alone that s/he is male, though 
we w o u l d l ikely think so. 
T h u s , the sexual orientat ion lesbian is unique among 
sexual orientations i n that it is inextricably l inked w i t h 
gender. 7 T h e fact that this sexual orientation alone 
involves a gender ascr ipt ion lends some plausib i l i ty to the 
gender deviance interpretation. In this one case, at least, 
the historical connection between sexual orientation and 
gender is not spurious. 
Sexual Orientation and Sexual Identity 
M u c h of Overall 's attention is devoted to a considera-
t ion of two other interpretations of the sexual orientation 
lesbian, interpretations w h i c h arise i n contemporary 
debate of two questions. S h o u l d the ascription of the 
sexual orientation lesbian have something to do w i t h 
sexuality or can one define a lesbian solely i n terms of her 
p o l i t i c a l commitments to women? S h o u l d the term les-
bian be interpreted i n such a way that self-acknow-
ledgement is part of the meaning of the ascription "She's a 
lesbian?" 
In her discussion of these questions Overal l argues for 
what I shal l ca l l the erotic interpretation; she claims that 
the term lesbian ought to keep its connections w i t h sexual-
ity. She argues against what I shal l cal l the self-acknow-
ledgement interpretation. We can al low that identi fying 
oneself as a lesbian is a sufficient condi t ion for being a 
lesbian, but, Overa l l contends, self-acknowledgement 
cannot be a necessary condi t ion . 
G i v e n her convict ion that the question, " W h a t is a 
lesbian?," is a po l i t i ca l quest ion, I confess to a certain 
surprise at Overall 's rejection of the self-acknowledge-
ment interpretation since it seems to better suit her o w n 
declared feminist po l i t i ca l perspective and feminist goals 
than the alternative. I propose to argue that her dismissal 
of the self-acknowledgement interpretation is too hasty, 
that it is based o n a misinterpretation and possible ignor-
ance of the consequences of the rejection of this view for 
our ascriptions of sexual identity. 
Overal l considers the self-acknowledgement interpreta-
tion as it is advanced i n the debate between Adrienne R i c h 
and A n n Ferguson. Ferguson claims that "It is not mean-
i n g f u l to conjecture that someone is a lesbian w h o refuses 
to acknowledge herself as such. " 8 She also urges the signif-
icance of m a k i n g this choice of sexual orientation w i t h i n 
the context of communi ty . As Overal l sees it, the view 
under consideration is one that holds that 
an i n d i v i d u a l cannot be said to have a sexual iden-
tity or orientation without the presence of a com-
m u n i t y of others who think of themselves as hav ing 
that identity. 
Overall rejects the view which w o u l d make self-conscious 
choice w i t h i n the content of a self-conscious communi ty a 
necessary condi t ion of the ascription of the sexual orienta-
t ion lesbian. Her arguments seem reasonable enough. She 
contends that the view w o u l d : (1) leave us w i t h the com-
plicated problem of determining w h i c h comes first—self-
defined lesbians or a lesbian community; and (2) it w o u l d 
entail the implausible consequence that we w o u l d have to 
say that pr ior to the late eighteenth century lesbians or 
heterosexuals d i d not exist. She further claims that, pace 
Ferguson, we can think of counter examples, cases i n 
w h i c h it is meaningful to say that someone is a lesbian 
w h o has not acknowledged herself as such. Overal l offers 
us such a counter example—"She's a real closet case 
herself." 9 
Overall 's observations about A n n Ferguson's view con-
cerning the ascription of the sexual orientation lesbian are 
somewhat persuasive u n t i l one recognizes that Overal l 
and Ferguson are speaking about different uses of the term 
" lesb ian . " Overal l is want ing to reject self-acknowledge-
ment as a necessary condit ion of the ascription of the 
sexual orientation lesbian whi le Ferguson is arguing for 
self-acknowledgement as a necessary condi t ion of the 
ascription of the sexual identity lesbian. 
I am reluctant to accept Overall 's arguments because I 
think what Ferguson says is correct, if we are ta lk ing about 
ascribing a sexual identity to someone. T h e truth of her 
observation lies w i t h the not ion of what it is to have an 
identity. It implies a self-consciousness. G i v e n what Over-
a l l thinks is i m p l i e d i n having an orientation, it is possible 
to have a sexual orientation without a s imilar sort of 
self-consciousness. 
F o l l o w i n g M a r i l y n Frye, Overall claims that an orienta-
t ion is " a focus of attention; the focus of one's alignment, 
bearings and inclinations i n l i fe . " T h i s may suggest that 
an orientation involves a consciousness, perhaps even a 
choice about how one directs one's attention. However, 
Overal l deliberately chooses the word "or ientat ion" i n 
order not to beg any questions about the possibility of choos-
i n g one's sexual orientation. T h u s , she points out that 
"or ienta t ion" has the negative connotations of being 
"one's adjustment, adaptation, accommodation, habitua-
t ion and c o n d i t i o n i n g i n l i fe . " Agreeing w i t h Adrienne 
R i c h , she pointedly claims that an orientation can be 
something that is, or has to be, " imposed, managed, 
organized, propagandized, maintained by force." 
T h u s , it is abundantly clear that a sexual orientation is 
something one can have unconsciously. It is something 
that need not involve any self-awareness and there need 
not be others w i t h the same orientation. It is not plausible 
to say this of one's identity. As Sartre remarks: 
What confers personal existence on a being is not the 
possession of an ego—which is only the sign of 
personality—but it is the fact that the being exists for 
itself. 1 0 
T h i s feature of identity does not preclude there being 
aspects of identity that are a result of c o n d i t i o n i n g and 
habituat ion. It is to take note that, i n some important 
sense, w h o we are is how we respond to what we are. 
T h e point of this discussion of the dist inct ion between 
sexual orientation and sexual identity is this: once the 
dist inct ion is clearly drawn, we realize that we cannot 
conflate the two notions and we cannot use the terms 
"sexual or ientat ion" and "sexual identi ty" interchangea-
bly. M o r e significantly, we cannot both reject the self-
acknowledgement interpretation and presume that ascrip-
tions of sexual orientation are l inked w i t h or inter-
changeable w i t h ascriptions of sexual identity. Indeed, 
failure to realize this point may be the cause of m u c h of the 
acr imonious disagreement about ascriptions of sexual 
orientation that Overal l finds moral ly objectionable. 
If we think that sexual orientation can be unconscious 
and can be given an interpretation w h i c h has no reference 
to an individual ' s sense of herself, then we are bound to 
r u n into trouble if it is also presumed that in ascribing a 
sexual orientation to others we are also, thereby, ascribing 
to them a sexual identity. O u r identities are very much tied 
u p w i t h w h o we think we are and any ascription of an 
identity w h i c h fails to take account of what we think is 
involved i n our identity w i l l provoke anger, resentment, 
and charges of serious misunderstanding. 1 1 
So now we must ask the question directly. Should we 
interpret ascriptions of sexual orientation so that they are 
(or can be) l inked wi th ascriptions of sexual identity? 
What considerations can be advanced that w o u l d help us 
decide? 
We should first note that the problem is immensely 
complicated by the fact that there is already a clear asym-
metry between first and third person ascriptions of sexual 
orientation. First person ascriptions of sexual orientation, 
"I am a lesbian," entail ascriptions of sexual identity. 
T h i r d person ascriptions of sexual orientation, "She is a 
lesbian," are assumed to be interchangeable w i t h ascrip-
tions of sexual identity i n their paradigmatic uses. H o w -
ever, third person ascriptions of sexual orientation need 
not be so interpreted. If we do not interpret them as ascrip-
tions of sexual identity, we w i l l fly i n the face of conven-
t ional practice and the question then arises as to whether 
we can then be saying anyth ing important about an i n d i -
v idual when we say "She is a lesbian" or "She's a 
heterosexual." 
I am not at a l l certain what Overall 's answer w o u l d be to 
the direct question, " S h o u l d we interpret ascriptions of 
sexual orientation as ascriptions of sexual identity?" 
There are hints that she might not want to try to make 
them al ign for she minimizes the significance of assertions 
about our sexuality as claims about our identity. She also 
insists that in declaring of someone, "She's a real closet 
case herself," we are saying something important about 
her. 
T r y i n g to guess at her answer to the direct question is 
not a s imple matter nor useful, for I suspect that Overal l is 
not w h o l l y aware of the available alternative views con-
cerning the connections between sexual orientations and 
sexual identity. In her defense of the erotic interpretation 
of the sexual orientation lesbian, she strongly urges that 
we reject an essentialist view of sexuality that is sometimes 
associated w i t h that interpretation. Her rejection of essen-
tialism entails tacit assumptions about the relation between 
sexuality and identity, as wel l as assumptions about the 
relation between biological determination of sexuality 
and choice of sexual orientation. These assumptions, 
unfortunately, effectively camouflage defensible alterna-
tive interpretations of the connections between ascriptions 
of sexual orientation and ascriptions of sexual identity. 
O n l y if we are ful ly cognizant of available alternative 
views can we offer a considered answer to the direct 
question. 
I mentioned previously that Overall 's rejection of the 
self-acknowledgement interpretation is surpris ing given 
her feminist pol i t ica l perspective. Specifically, given her 
suggestion that our def ini t ion of the term " lesb ian" 
should be interpreted i n terms of a woman's erotic feelings 
and from "an internal, not an external perspective," that 
is, f rom the point of view of a woman's perspective o n her 
o w n erotic feelings. It is also surpr is ing given Overall 's 
o w n defense of the positive evaluation that can be (or 
should be) associated w i t h the sexual orientations hetero-
sexuality and bisexuality. 
Overal l argues that w i t h respect to a l l sexual orienta-
tions we have a choice, i n the sense that we can take 
responsibil i ty for our sexual orientation. She urges that 
we acknowledge this possibi l i ty , encourage people to 
exercise it, and value the transcendence the exercise of this 
responsibi l i ty makes possible. Clear ly , we might expect 
her to consistently and strongly support the self-acknow-
ledgement interpretation of sexual orientation, but she 
rejects it. I suspect it is because she tacitly assumes that if 
we adopt the view that sexual orientation holds the key to 
w h o or what we are, then we must adopt some form of 
essentialist view of sexuality. A n essentialist's view of sex-
uality is something she clearly wants to reject. 
In her argument for the erotic interpretation Overal l 
urges that we understand an ascription of the sexual orien-
tation lesbian to entai l an ascr ipt ion of erotic feeling to a 
w o m a n . However , she also warns us that if we do adopt 
this interpretation, 
It is important to avo id an essentialist's view of 
sexuality: i n this case, the view that what we feel is 
the key to w h o or what we really are. 
Overa l l is insistent on this point . She contends that 
"sexuality is socially constructed; a social not a biological 
p h e n o m e n o n . " Admittedly , our sexuality may be expe-
rienced as "natura l and inherent" ; nevertheless, she claims 
that "sexual desire and attraction are as much cultural 
artifacts as are gender roles." Hence, she reiterates her 
c l a i m that "erotic feeling should not be understood as 
being revelatory of what one really i s , " and more specif-
ical ly : 
O u r search for meanings of ascriptions of sexual 
orientation ought not to i m p l y a search for a fixed 
sexual essence of nature that lies buried beneath 
layers of social ordering i n each of us. 
A g a i n , i n defending her rejection of the self-acknow-
ledgement interpretation she says of her counter example, 
"She's a real closet case herself": 
Such an ascription does not lay c l a i m to revealing 
the woman's inner essence of "true identi ty ." It is 
not m a k i n g a metaphysical dist inct ion between 
appearance and reality... . 
F r o m these passages it appears as though Overal l is tacit-
ly assuming that if we h o l d that sexual orientation or 
erotic feeling is the key to w h o or what we are, then we must 
h o l d that there is " a fixed sexual essence of nature that lies 
buried beneath layers of social order ing i n each of us . " 
These passages confound a number of separable issues: 
(1) nature vs. nurture, or biological vs. cultural determi-
nation of sexuality; 
(2) whether or not we have some choice about our sexu-
ality i n a casual sense (as opposed to the sense i n w h i c h we 
can take responsibility for it); 
(3) whether, or to what extent, our sexuality is f ixed or 
reversible; 
(4) whether, or to what extent, sexuality is central to our 
identity; and 
(5) whether what is revelatory of w h o we really are must 
be something that is fixed, immutable, natural. 
Because these issues are conflated, there are a variety of 
possibilities that are ignored or camouflaged: 1 2 
(1) that sexuality is cultural ly mediated and plays a cen-
tral role i n our identity (such that I can say that my erotic 
feelings do indicate who I really am); 
(2) that sexuality is a fixed biological ly given i.alure aud 
yet it plays little role i n our identity; 
(3) that our sexuality is socially constructed (learned) 
and fixed (we might say i n Overall 's terms, a fixed sexual 
essence that lies buried i n our layers of social ordering); 
and f inal ly 
(4) that sexuality is biologically determined and cul tu-
rally mediated, w i t h parts of it fixed and parts of it not, and 
it st i l l plays a central role i n our identity. 
T h u s , I w o u l d argue, contrary to Overall 's tacit assump-
tion, that we can interpret ascriptions of sexual orientation 
i n terms of erotic feelings and also c la im that such ascrip-
tions are, or may be, revelatory of w h o we really are. In 
short, I w o u l d c l a i m that ascriptions of sexual orientation, 
interpreted i n terms of our erotic feelings, may be ascrip-
tions of sexual identity even though sexuality is (primar-
ily) a cul tural construct. There is a possibility that Overal l 
seems not to see. We can accept the erotic interpretation, 
accept the self-acknowledgement interpretation and so 
have ascriptions of sexual orientation a l i g n w i t h ascrip-
tions of sexual identity, and sti l l reject essentialism. 
M y o w n view is that our sexuality is probably b io logi -
cally determined to some extent, and certainly cultural ly 
mediated. I suspect that some aspects of it are fixed and 
some are not. I think that, for some people, sexuality is a 
central part of their identity, and for others it is not . 1 3 T h e 
point I a m concerned to make i n this commentary is that 
for many people, and perhaps especially for women, sex-
ual orientation should not be viewed as easily separable 
from sexual identity. 
Feminist Political Considerations for Adopting the Self-
Acknowledgement Interpretation 
Overal l ins ight ful ly recognizes that pol i t ica l considera-
tions play a role i n determining definitions. She herself 
offers clearly pol i t i ca l reasons for mainta in ing the l ink 
between the term " l e s b i a n " and sexuality. I offer the fol -
l o w i n g empir ica l and pol i t i ca l considerations consistent 
w i t h a feminist perspective for adopt ing the self-acknow-
ledgement interpretation of the sexual orientation lesbian. 
First, an argument w h i c h should have special appeal 
for Overa l l . T h e self-acknowledgement interpretation 
best meets Overall 's w i s h to construct the meaning of the 
ascriptions of sexual orientation from a woman's perspec-
tive o n her o w n erotic feelings. If we reject the self-
acknowledgement interpretation, we must give u p the 
c la im to be adopting an " internal pespective," the per-
spective Overal l , for good reasons, wanted to take in i t ia l ly . 
T h e best reason, for a l l of us, to adopt this interpretation 
is that it w o u l d maximize the opportunity for women to 
define their o w n sexuality, to define themselves. His tor i -
cally, w o m e n and their experience have been c o m p u l -
sively sexualized by men. T h e power of n a m i n g has 
belonged to men and as a consequence women have had 
little or no opportuni ty to k n o w their o w n sexuality. We 
have had little or no opportuni ty to be self-determining i n 
matters sexual. T h e adoption of the self-acknowledgement 
interpretation shifts the power of n a m i n g to the indiv id-
ual herself. Instead of label ing, we have requests for 
informat ion. T h e opportunities for others to arrogate our 
identity are thereby reduced. 
T h e self-acknowledgement interpretation has further 
benefits. It emphasizes that we can take responsibility for 
our sexuality, for our sexual orientation, and it directs our 
attention to this fact. O u r assertions of sexual orientation 
are no longer presumed to occur i n a context of d iscr imi-
nat ion or a n investigation of pathology. T h e self-acknow-
ledgement interpretation shifts our attention from the 
question of how one becomes a lesbian and places it on the 
sense i n w h i c h we are, or can be, responsible for who we 
are. T h i s shift i n emphasis is cryptical ly noted by one 
young lesbian who, when asked about her sexual orienta-
t ion, replied, 
T h e question is not, W h y a m I gay? That 's l ike 
ask ing why a m I smart?—The question is, What a m 
I g o i n g to do about i t? 1 4 
There is, i n addit ion, an argument for the self-acknow-
ledgment interpretation that can be made o n the basis of 
empir ica l considerations concerning women's reality. 
Overa l l correctly notes one k i n d of mistake that has been 
made i n the past i n interpretations of sexual or ienta t ion— 
the mistake of assuming that one's sexual identity is the 
whole of one's identity. She r ightly rejects this assump-
t ion. However, there is another error that can occur i n 
interpreting ascriptions of sexual orientation—the mis-
take of assuming that the whole of one's identity has 
n o t h i n g to do w i t h one's sexual identity and, by extension, 
one's sexual orientation. There is good reason to believe 
that our sexuality is s ignif icantly mediated by our gender, 
race, class, and culture, as wel l as by our o w n previous 
sexual history. A s a consequence, we cannot define an 
indiv idual ' s sexual orientation, understanding it to be 
part of their identity, i n isolation from their gender, race, 
class and culture because, as V i c k y Spelman says, " O u r 
identities just aren't constructed and lived i n that w a y . " 1 5 
T h i s seems especially true for women. 
F r o m what we know about women's sexuality and their 
identity, i n this culture, the self-acknowledgement inter-
pretation of sexual orientation seems the most approp-
riate. T h e relevant and significant facts about the sexuality 
and identity of women we have studied are these: 1 6 
(1) women's sexuality is f l u i d and labile; 
(2) women's sexuality is h ighly contextualized, that is, 
w o m e n experience their sexuality w i t h i n the context of 
relationships and interpret their sexuality i n terms of 
int imacy; that is, women's sexuality is not easily separable 
from other aspects of their identity; 
(3) women's identity is h ighly contextualized; that is, it 
is understood i n terms of their relations w i t h others. 
It seems clear that women's sexuality, especially, is not 
easily separable f rom other aspects of their identity. We 
can ascribe sexual orientation to women on the basis of 
their sexual activity or i n terms of their erotic feelings, but 
research suggests that this is not how women themselves 
understand their o w n sexual orientation. M e n , it seems, 
do use these same criteria to self-ascribe a sexual orienta-
t ion, but not w o m e n . 1 7 T h u s , we may need to differentiate 
interpretations of ascriptions of sexual orientation w i t h 
respect to gender. Ascript ions of sexual orientation to 
women, to the extent that they are to a l i g n w i t h ascrip-
tions of sexual identity, are a matter of enormous com-
plexity. T h i s complexity is best incorporated into our 
interpretations of ascriptions of sexual orientation through 
the condit ion of self-acknowledgement. 
G i v e n the contextualization of women's sexuality and 
their identity, we want to avoid situations w h i c h , as Jan 
M o r r i s poignant ly remarks, " I had no identity because I 
was not to others what I was to myself . 1 8 
In general, i n matters of h u m a n concern, we should 
struggle to reduce the circumstances i n w h i c h persons are 
not to others what they are to themselves. We should 
endeavor to maximize the opportunit ies to have persons 
themselves tell us w h o or what they are. A d o p t i n g the 
self-acknowledgement interpretation w o u l d a l low this 
and, thereby, also reduce the m u t u a l name-cal l ing and 
disagreements that we a l l f i n d somewhat objectionable. 
Overal l adopts the erotic interpretation of the sexual 
orientation lesbian because she rightly recognizes that the 
expl ic i t acknowledgement of sexuality between women 
poses a serious challenge to the patriarchy and acknowl-
edges the importance of the movement for sexual libera-
t ion for women. These same reasons underwrite the adop-
t ion of the self-acknowledgement interpretation of sexual 
orientations. I can imagine no greater challenge to the 
patriarchy than to have w o m e n themselves tell us what 
their sexual nature is. If one cares about the movement for 
sexual l iberation, what more genuine sexual l iberation is 
conceivable than to have the opportuni ty , and responsi-
bi l i ty , to determine one's o w n sexual self-definition, to be 
expected to determine one's o w n sexual self-definition. 
T h e last, and f ina l , argument for the adoption of the 
self-acknowledgement interpretation is a simple one. 
There are no good reasons for persons ascribing n o n self-
acknowledged sexual orientations to others. 1 9 As Florence 
Kennedy once remarked w i t h respect to gender, " W h y do 
they want to know? So they can discriminate?" 
There are, as I have suggested, many good reasons for 
letting people themselves decide w h o or what they are. 
N O T E S 
This essay has benefited from my discussions with A n n Dillerand Barbara 
Brockelman. 
1. Adrienne Rich. "It Is the Lesbian in Us. . . ," in On Lies, Secrets, and 
Silence: Selected Prose, 1966-1978. New York: W.W. Norton, 1979, 
p. 202. 
2. Marilyn Frye. "Lesbian Feminism and the Gay Rights Movement: 
Another View of Male Supremacy, Another Separatism," in The 
Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory. Trumansburg, N Y : 
The Crossing Press, 1983, p. 129. 
3. For an interesting summary of the literature on this question and an 
excellent critical review of the literature on lesbian adolescent devel-
opment, see Elizabeth Brooks Heron, "Lesbian Adolescence: A 
Review of the Literature," unpublished Qualifying Paper submit-
ted to Harvard University, 1983. 
4. For a fuller discussion of the distinctions captured by the terms 
"gender identity," "core gender identity," and "gender-role iden-
tity," as well as "gender role," see Maryann Ayim and Barbara 
Houston, " T h e Epistemology of Gender Identity: Implications for 
Social Policy," Social Theory and Practice, Vol . 2, No. 1, 1985. 
5. A clear and painful account of how this occurs can be found in Julia 
Penelope, " T h e Mystery of Lesbians," a two-part article printed in 
Lesbian Ethics, Vol. 1, No. 1 and No. 2, 1984, 1985. 
6. Jeffner Allen. Lesbian Philosophy: Explorations. Palo Alto, Cali-
fornia: Institute of Lesbian Studies, 1986, p. 22, original italics. 
7. There is a complication that I have ignored here. One might argue 
that the term "lesbian" is inextricably linked not with gender but 
with biological sex. It could be contended that a lesbian is not a 
woman, but a female. I think we can safely ignore the complication 
because my sense is that we only resort to this assertion if someone 
has changed their gender. For example, do we call Rene Richards (a 
noted "male toconstrucied-female" transsexual) a lesbian if she now 
has sexual relations with women? She has changed her gender from 
man to woman. If we acknowledge that a lesbian is someone of the 
gender woman, then we will call her a lesbian. However, if we feel 
reluctant to call her a lesbian, we may want to claim that a lesbian is 
not a woman but a female, and thus Rene Richards cannot be a 
lesbian simply by virtue of changing her gender. However, has she 
changed her gender or her sex; or has she changed both? 
If we want to address this complication, we may put the point this 
way. The sexual orientation lesbian is inextricably tied to either 
biological sex or gender. In either case, we still have reason to query 
Overall's claim that "sex, gender, and sexual orientation are not 
inextricably linked." One or the other of gender or biological sex is 
inextricably linked to the sexual orientation lesbian. 
8. A n n Ferguson. "Patriarchy, Sexual Identity, and the Sexual Revolu-
tion" in Nannerl O . Koehane, Michelle Z. Rosaldo and Barbara C. 
Gelpi , editors. Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 154. 
9. Overall also objects to Ferguson's view on the grounds that it would 
sever the connection between eroticism and lesbianism. I am not 
persuaded of this, but it is somewhat beside the point to argue the 
issue here; hence, I have omitted this further argument of Overall's. 
10. Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness. Translated by H . Barnes. 
New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. 
11. See Julia Penelope, "The Mystery of Lesbians," for illuminations of 
this point. 
12. My grasping of the confounding of these several different issues was 
aided by my reading of Jean Kennard's extremely interesting paper, 
"Ourself behind Ourself: A Theory for Lesbian Readers," in Eliza-
beth Flynn and Patrocinio Schweickart, editors. Gender and Read-
ing: Essays on Readers, Texts and Contexts. Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 1986, pp. 63-80. 
13. My views on this matter are influenced by and similar to those 
expressed by Ethel Spector Person in "Sexuality as the Mainstay of 
Identity: Psychoanalytic Perspectives," in Catharine Stimpson and 
Ethel Spector Person, editors. Women: Sex and Sexuality. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1980, pp. 36-61. 
Consider the following poignant statement of a male homosexual 
which clearly indicates that for him, his sexuality is absolutely 
central to his identity. "If my homosexuality is wrong, the fact of my 
being is wrong. Because that's what I am." This quotation occurs in 
an article in The Boston Globe, September 16, 1986, on Carol Lynn 
Pearson's book, Goodbye, I Love You, published by Random 
House. 
Person and Heron both acknowledge that the empirical literature 
seems to support the view that, in general, for men, sexuality is 
central to their identity as men, whereas this seems not to be the case 
for women. However, both acknowledge that if one's sexuality is 
"deviant," then it is more likely to play a central part in the identity 
of both women and men. The one clear conclusion we can draw 
from the empirical literature is that the relations between sexuality 
and identity are exceedingly complex. 
14. Quoted in Elizabeth Heron. "Lesbian Adolescence: A Review of the 
Literature," p. 43, from Boston Gay and Lesbian Youth (BAGLY) 
interview. 
15. Victoria Spelman, "Women: The One and the Many," unpublished 
paper. 
16. The sources for these findings are Elizabeth Heron. "Lesbian Ado-
lescence: A Review of the Literature," and Ethel Spector Person, 
"Sexuality as the Mainstay of Identity: Psychoanalytic Perspec-
tives." 
On Coming Home 
From Another Boring Lecture on Wimmin's 
Studies Class of Wimmin, Myth and Ritual 
Lectures 
Facts 
Slides 
Footnotes 
N o soul 
N o fire 
N o rage 
Scientific objectivity 
Impeccable credentials 
Academic excellence 
N o tongue 
N o heart 
N o cunt 
17 Elizabeth Heron, "Lesbian Adolescence: A Review of the Litera-
ture," and Ethel Spector Person, "Sexuality as the Mainstay of 
Identity: Psychoanalytic Perspectives." 
18. Jan Morris. Conundrum. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
Inc., 1974, p. 41. 
19. Well, there may be, in some cases, in some contexts, good reasons for 
ascribing non self-acknowledged sexual orientations to others. For 
example, we might allow that in a self-chosen and trustworthy 
therapeutic context there might be reason to (tentatively) attribute a 
lesbian sexual orientation to someone who did not acknowledge it. 
However, I think we make a mistake if we do not recognize that such 
a context is not the place to look for a paradigmatic case of ascribing 
sexual orientations. Nor, should we forget that even the uses of the 
term "lesbian" in therapeutic contexts are ultimately parasitic upon 
the meanings of the term as used in more ordinary contexts. 
Goddess protect us f rom ourselves 
Let us l ight incense and candles 
Take off our shirts and shoes 
Push back the student desks 
Made room to stomp and chant 
Let us draw big cunts on the board 
Y e l l out our names and Her names 
Beat sweaty breasts and drums 
R u b our blood on the walls 
Let us rage and celebrate our Goddesselves 
Ila Suzanne 
Ca l i forn ia 
